China Coast Guard vessel 3303 deploys water cannons on July 24, 2026, against Philippine public vessel MMOV 3001, which had intruded into China's Huangyan Dao waters, forcing the vessel to turn around and sail away from Huangyan Dao. Photo: Courtesy of China Coast Guard Cloaked in the academic mantle of a Stanford‑affiliated "think‑tank" but operated by retired US military officers; dispatching no warships but endlessly churning out provocation scripts in the South China Sea, and shifting from choreographing footage of maritime stand‑offs to meddling in legitimate China‑Philippine cultural and academic exchanges, the SeaLight has loomed behind numerous China‑Philippine maritime frictions over the past years. The true nature of the SeaLight, once stripped of disguise, is a well‑orchestrated cognitive‑war tool targeting China. It delivers strategies, provides talking points, furnishes intelligence and cultivates proxies, weaponizing both maritime confrontations and people‑to‑people exchanges to deliberately stir up tensions in the South China Sea. A cognitive‑war platform
Public information indicates that SeaLight is affiliated with Stanford University's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, established in 2021 with sponsorship from the US Office of Naval Research and funding from the US Department of Defense. The funding sources amounted to approximately $12.8 million. Public records indicate that SeaLight's "director" Ray Powell served 35 years in the US Air Force, including posts in the Philippines, Japan, Germany, and Qatar. In 2022, following his departure from overseas service, he launched "Project Myoushu," which evolved into "SeaLight" in 2023. When Global Times reporter browsed SeaLight's website, multiple unprofessional features of this self‑proclaimed "think‑tank" came to light. Aside from its "director" Powell, the team counts merely three other members, one of whom is a web developer. Even so, this same "think tank" smeared China's lawful actions to safeguard sovereignty in the South China Sea on its website as the world's "most expansive and aggressive maritime gray‑zone programs." In February this year, Guo Wei, Deputy Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Manila, wrote in an X post that as a US-based organization, SeaLight maintains "an unusually concentrated focus on the South China Sea." It has reacted to maritime developments with remarkable speed, at times even preceding official statements from Philippine authorities. "Why does SeaLight concentrate so heavily on this specific region? Through what channels does a US-based entity obtain rapid access to satellite imagery and operational information located thousands of kilometers away?" Guo asked. A Manila‑based source told the Global Times on Friday that SeaLight maintains close‑knit, in‑depth coordination with the Philippine Coast Guard. The two sides sustain long‑term information exchange and intelligence‑sharing, forming a collaborative model through which the Philippines provokes maritime incidents at sea, SeaLight assigns public‑narrative framing, and social media platforms amplify the hype, to stage targeted cognitive‑war games against China. Billed as a research institute, SeaLight is essentially a China‑targeting cognitive‑war platform centered on a small group of individuals, supplying the Philippines with policy advice, intelligence inputs and public‑narration talking points, Chen Xiangmiao, a research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told the Global Times on Friday. In addition, it serves as a megaphone for the Philippines, churning out disinformation across social‑media platforms to viciously smear China and fabricate the "China threat" narrative, courting international attention in a deliberate bid to stoke regional tensions, Chen added. "An ex-US Air Force colonel is now running the show in Philippine foreign relations," Rod Kapunan, a columnist for the Philippines' daily newspaper The Standard, wrote in his article in 2024. He further described Powell as the author of the "transparency strategy," which Philippine officials took as "Philippine policy." "SeaLight hides its main objective, which is to apply the 'missing context fallacy' to create an anti-China narrative out of the South China Sea territorial claims disputes amongst the five littoral states surrounding the strategically critical body of water," Kapunan said in the article. "Still, its China‑focused cognitive warfare yields diminishing marginal returns," said Chen, "Repeated lies fail to convince the public. For this reason, it keeps hunting for new material for attacks, yet it can never create any major ripples." Back in September 2024, an article in The Diplomat titled "The Philippines Should Take Note: 'Assertive Transparency' Is Not a Strategy" noted that it was in 2023, "spurred on by the likes Raymond Powell and the folks at Project Myoushu, that the Philippines began publicizing maritime incidents in the South China Sea." However, what Philippine authorities need to understand is that "assertive transparency" has reached its saturation point. The second battlefield
For a long period, SeaLight fought its main battles on South China Sea waters, guiding the Philippines to hype stand‑offs and fabricate the false "China bullying the Philippines" narrative. Lately, however, it has shifted its battlefield, targeting normal China‑Philippine cultural and academic people‑to‑people exchanges. Last month, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. called for greater scrutiny of foreign academic and cultural exchange programs with China, in response to a SeaLight report that claimed China's Jinan University has become the main broker between China's institutions and Chinese-language schools in the Philippines. This incident directly forced the cancellation of a three‑week‑long field research trip to the Philippines scheduled for August 4 by Dai Fan, Director of the Center for Philippine Studies at Jinan University. Dai told the Global Times on Friday that this incident lays bare the fact that SeaLight is by no means a rigorous, neutral academic‑research platform. Instead, it follows a propaganda playbook where conclusions come first and evidence is cobbled together afterwards. Nevertheless, this simplistic and heavy‑handed narrative is highly deceptive and manipulative in the public opinion arena. It can easily mislead the Philippine public and foster one‑sided perceptions, Dai added. In an X post on August 2, the Chinese Embassy in Manila further pointed out that the incident marks Ray Powell's "second battlefield" against China, from maritime disputes to civil society. "His broader objective appears clear: to encourage the Philippines to view nearly every interaction with China through the lens of strategic confrontation, gradually transforming the country into a frontline state in Washington's competition with Beijing. The ultimate goal is to systematically turn the Philippines into a 'proxy battlefield' for containing China," reads the embassy's X post. The latest report released by SeaLight was immediately echoed by Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro, underscoring the close collusion between the two sides, Chen noted. Based on long‑term observations by a Global Times source based in the Philippines, SeaLight, the Philippine Coast Guard and pro‑US, anti‑China hard‑line forces in the country have forged an interconnected chain. They have long sought to push for amendments and upgrades to the Philippines' anti‑espionage law and advance legislation for the so‑called "proxy bill," aiming to establish a systematic, institutionalized anti‑China mechanism. According to Chen, there is a strong likelihood that Philippine authorities provide financial backing for SeaLight's China‑focused cognitive‑war operations. Meanwhile, Powell and SeaLight have become a key instrument for the Philippine military to secure budget appropriations from Congress. This strategy creates a sinister closed‑interest loop: stoking maritime frictions, whipping up domestic public sentiment, and pressuring Congress to divert livelihood‑related budgets to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The tenser the maritime situation, the more resources flow to the PCG. By contrast, calm seas strip the force of its rationale for expansion, Chen said. According to Chen, this opportunistic hype‑driven model adopted by the Philippine side in collusion with SeaLight will ultimately backfire. The South China Sea disputes could have been managed through dialogue to share marine and fishery resources and deliver mutually beneficial outcomes. However, SeaLight keeps stoking conflicts and amplifying divisions, severely undermining the Philippines' environment for peaceful development, at the expense of the Filipino people's vital interests. Regional countries ought to see through the true nature of such external "think‑tank" projects. They should recognize the harm these entities inflict on regional well‑being, peace and stability by artificially orchestrating public opinion storms over the South China Sea, said Chen. The Philippines' ill-judged farce of provoking China will sooner or later end in tragedy for itself, Chen warned. 。
B | 知道这些有什么用呢？要明白咱们所有的运营动作都是跟着平台政策走的，比如今年平台严抓产品质量分，咱们链接的流量就会随平台规则的调整而变化，之前品质不好但是价格有优势的品，轻松实现日销千单万单，在新的政策之下，就不行了。
C | 你猜我是怎么知道的，我现在不是做拼多多代运营了嘛，前几天接的一个店，百货类的品，成本很有优势，我挂9.67卖2件，当天一阶段冲了40单，次日200单，三日500单，四日300单，五日0单。这咋一夜归零了？品质出问题了，推广受限了。 于是我就知道了，今年不能玩辣鸡品了。继续说回拼多多目前所处的阶段，当流量到顶时，平台往往想的就是流量变现了，这也是为什么去年和今年都是强付费为主，自然流为辅了。
D | 因为平台已经到了求稳变现阶段了。 01 拼多多今年核心玩法：活动+车 准确的说，今年的核心玩法应该是强付费，但是实际跑的过程中，我就发现了，如果一个链接即玩强付费，同时又去报活动，效果真的可以做到1+1大于2。那么活动配车要怎么玩呢？ 咱们先说车吧，这个简单，不管你是小白还是老手，拼多多直通车应该都会开吧。玩法定了，那么咱们的定价就得跟着玩法来，玩车肯定要定高价，20%以上的利润是要有的。 我玩强付费一般喜欢定50%的利润空间，这种针对的是低客单的品，比如拖鞋，成本5块钱的，就可以定价9块多，然后直通车2~3的投产比直接开车。只要能跑的动，就有的赚。
E | 对于高客单的品，我代运营的品里面也有单价100元左右的，这种品我的定价思路是统一加价15~20元，然后按照成交出价5~10块钱的单笔花费去出价，只要出单咱也是稳赚，主打一个稳赚不赔。 定价这块确定了，接下来就是定玩法了，既然咱们主打的是活动+车，那么在价格设置这块就有讲究了，首先不能直接用限时限量购打到到手价，而是要结合券来玩。
F | 我就直接举个例子吧。比如我最近接的衣架这个品，为了保护甲方隐私，以下数据做了脱敏处理，仅供参考。假设这个品的成本是5块钱，我定价是9.8块钱，最终设置的价格是拼单价19.8，限时限量购15.8，新客立减券6，最终到手价9.8。 这样做的目的是什么呢？听我慢慢讲。咱们主打的是活动+车对不对，但是这里面有个问题，你这个链接刚上架就直接去报活动吗？肯定不是的。 尤其是我只有一个品时，我做的每条链接都去上活动，其结果就是每条链接都上不了活动。能理解这句话吗？因为被比价了嘛。单品最多1条链接在活动位上，除非大家防比价做的很专业，以我对大家的了解，这块能做的好的，不到1%。所以，大家只能选择1个品1条链接上活动了。
G | 那么问题来了，咱们一个品一次性上了几十条链接，该选哪条链接去上活动呢？活动有个特点，就是马太效应。有单的链接上了活动单量会更多，没单的链接上了活动也是没单。 所以，设置新客立减券的目的就是配合直通车测试用的，这么多链接同时开车，就看哪条能跑的好，跑的不好的链接及时的下架或者取消新客立减券，这样只保留1条带券的链接，他的价格就是全店最低价，只要没与其他店铺的同款比价，这条链接就可以去上20981或者22660了。 02 活动+车玩法的注意事项 能直通车跑起来的尽量不上活动，因为上活动后事情就多了。最常见的就是跑着跑着活动掉了，可能店铺星级不够了，又或者被比价了。你说要不要继续上活动？店铺星级掉了，说明品质不行，这个只能拜佛了，求保佑不要再来差评了。
H | 被比价了，那就得洗SKU，单量越多的链接，洗SKU掉量的风险越高。像我300单的链接，洗SKU都极为的谨慎，改1个字都会斟酌很久，改不好权重清零，单量就没了。 只开直通车就简单多了，只要拖价这块不掉链子，单量就能稳住。活动+车目前测试比较稳的就是大促活动了，据我测试，链接单量越多好像是有比价保护一样，就是单量越多的链接越不容易被比价。
I | 现在新的黑标规则也改了，品质不行的就会与白牌同品比价，我推测，大链接加高品质，比价到辣鸡链接的概率会很小，这也是为什么我们做同款低价链接截流不到的原因。 03 最后 活动+车适合厂家和品牌方，如果你是拿货来卖的，就不适合玩这个玩法了。因为你的每条链接都会被比价，任何活动都上不去。 厂家和品牌方开车就会有单，上活动只是单量进一步放大的手段，毕竟每个老板都是贪婪的，今天有5000单了，就希望明天6000单，就算单量到顶了，也希望能再冲一波，那么只开车没有上活动的链接，就可以用活动+车的玩法来冲一波了。 作者：老虎讲运营，运营书籍《全栈运营高手》作者；电商知识星球《虎虎生威电商圈子》主理人；电商运营推广大牛，千万流水项目操盘手，多平台专栏作家，专注产品运营与推广，擅长品牌打造和爆款制造，号称运营界扛把子。
J |
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